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Validated FIPS and FIPS Cryptographic Modules

Cert#Vendor / CST LabCryptographic ModuleModule
TypeValidation
DateSunset
DateLevel / DescriptionFortinet, Inc.
Moodie Drive
Ottawa, ON K2H 8G3
Canada

Alan Kaye
TEL: x
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP FortiManager
(Firmware Version: vbuild (GA))
(When operated in FIPS mode and configured according to the Entropy Token Section of the Security Policy. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy. There is no assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Firmware12/29/12/28/Overall Level: 1

-Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces: Level 3
-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): FortiManagerD with the Fortinet entropy token (part number FTR-ENT-1 )

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); DES; MD5; HMAC-MD5
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The FortiManager OS is a firmware operating system that runs exclusively on Fortinet's FortiManager product family. FortiManager units are PC-based, purpose built appliances."
Aruba a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
Crossman Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA
USA

Steve Weingart
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP Aruba AP and AP Wireless Access Points
(Hardware Versions: APF1 and APF1 with FIPS kit ; Firmware Versions: ArubaOS FIPS and ArubaOS FIPS)
(When operated in FIPS mode with tamper evident labels installed as indicated in the Security Policy.)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/24/
01/15/
07/06/7/5/Overall Level: 2

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. #, # and #); SHS (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); MD5; NDRNG
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"Aruba's ac Wi-Fi access points operate at gigabit speeds, offering extreme performance for mobile devices. In FIPS mode, the AP & support encrypted management and WPA2 tunneled pass through to Aruba Mobility Controllers. Aruba APs also support wireless intrusion detection/prevention services and wireless mesh topologies."
Cisco Systems, Inc.
W Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA
USA

Global Certification Team

CST Lab: NVLAP Cisco Integrated Services Router (ISR) and (with SM-ES3XP, SM-ES3XP, SM-D-ES3XP, PVDM, PVDM, PVDM and PVDM) and Cisco Integrated Services Router (ISR) (with PVDM, PVDM, PVDM and PVDM)
(Hardware Versions: ISR [1], ISR [2] and ISR [3] with SM-ES3XP [1,2], SM-ES3XP [1,2], SM-D-ES3XP [1,2], PVDM [1,2,3], PVDM [1,2,3], PVDM [1,2,3] and PVDM [1,2,3]; Firmware Version: IOS-XE )
(When operated in FIPS mode)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/24/12/23/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: AES (non-compliant); DES; Diffie-Hellman (key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); HMAC-MD5; MD5; NDRNG; RC4; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); KBKDF (non-compliant);
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Integrated Services Router (ISR) are routing platforms that provide comprehensive security services including VPN for small businesses, enterprise small branch and teleworkers. The platforms are architected to enable the next phase of branch-office evolution, providing rich media collaboration and virtualization to the branch while offering a wide-range of connectivity options."
Athena SCS, Inc.
Lark Ave.
Suite
San Jose, CA
USA

Stephanie Motre
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP iEngine SSID Applet on Athena SCS IDProtect Duo for SLE78
(Hardware Version: Infineon SLE78CLFXP P-MCC package; Firmware Version: Athena IDProtect with iEngine SSID Applet V)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/23/12/22/Overall Level: 3

-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); KBKDF (Cert. #59); SHS (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG
Single Chip

"IDProtect is a Cryptographic Module based on the Athena OS Java Card smartcard operating system with KB of Flash. IDProtect is compliant with the latest Java Card and Global Platform specifications. IDProtect supports FIPS approved DRBG, SHA-2, AES, ECDSA and ECC key generation. The SSID Java Card applet of iEngine is an applet supporting the latest version of the SSID standard for high-performance government application."
Hewlett Packard®, Enterprise
Taylor Street
Littleton, MA
USA

Nagesh Kuriyavar
TEL:
FAX:

Paul Rozeboom
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP HP OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module
(Software Version: I-HSS )

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software12/22/12/21/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): HP NonStop v J running on Integrity NonStop BladeSystem NBc (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: N/A
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The HP OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module provides cryptographic services that allows the HP OpenCall HLR to protect sensitive application and subscriber data at rest and during transit"
Toshiba Corporation
, Shibaura 1-chome
Minato-ku
Tokyo, Tokyo
Japan

Tohru Iwamoto
TEL: +

CST Lab: NVLAP Toshiba TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Hard Disk Drive (AL14SEQ model)
(Hardware Versions: A0 with AL14SEQ18EPB, AL14SEQ12EPB, AL14SEQ09EPB, AL14SEQ18EQB, AL14SEQ12EQB, AL14SEQ09EQB; Firmware Version: )

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/22/12/21/Overall Level: 2

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG
Multi-Chip Embedded

"The Toshiba TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Hard Disk Drive is used for hard disk drive data security. This Cryptographic Module (CM) provides various cryptographic services using FIPS approved algorithms. Services include hardware-based data encryption, cryptographic erase, independently protected user data LBA bands, and FW download."
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
R5 , Maetan 3-dong Yeongton-gu
Suwon-si, Gyeonggi
Korea

Bumhan Kim
TEL: +

CST Lab: NVLAP Samsung Flash Memory Protector V
(Hardware Version: ; Software Version: )

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software-Hybrid12/21/12/20/Overall Level: 1

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Android Lollipop running on Samsung Galaxy S6 (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: N/A
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The driver for the on-the-fly Hardware encryption module to flash memory for Disk/File Encryption solution. The Harware module supports AES with CBC mode and XTS-AES cryptographic services."
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
Compaq Center Drive West
Houston, TX
USA

Catherine Schwartz

CST Lab: NVLAP HP P-Class Smart Array Gen9 RAID Controllers
(Hardware Versions: Pbr, Pbr, P, P, and Pm; Firmware Version: )
(When installed, initialized and configured as specified in the Security Policy Section 3)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Hardware12/21/12/20/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 2
-Design Assurance: Level 2
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); SHS (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping); NDRNG
Multi-Chip Embedded

"The HP P-Class Smart Array RAID Controllers make up a family of serial-attached SCSI host bus adapters that provide intelligent control for storage array. The controllers can be card-based or embedded within an HP server, and provide a high speed data path, on-board storage cache, remote management, and encryption of data at rest, for the controlled storage arrays."
Cisco Systems, Inc.
West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA
USA

Global Certification Team

CST Lab: NVLAP Cisco FIPS Object Module
(Software Version: )
(When installed, initialized and configured as specified in the Security Policy Section and operated in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy.)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software12/21/12/20/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Linux running on an Octeon Evaluation Board CN on a Cisco WLC without Octeon
Linux running on an Octeon Evaluation Board CN on a Cisco WLC with Octeon
Linux running on an Intel Xeon on a Cisco UCS C22 M3
Android v running on a Qualcomm Snapdragon Pro APQ ARMv7 on a Google Nexus 4
Windows running on an Intel Core i7 on a Gateway FX without PAA
Windows running on an Intel Core i7 on a Gateway FX with PAA
FreeBSD running on an Intel Xeon on a Cisco UCS C M2 (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); CVL (Certs. #, #, # and #); DRBG (Certs. # and #); DSA (Certs. # and #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); KBKDF (Certs. #52 and #53); RSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Cisco FIPS Object Module (FOM) is a software library that provides cryptographic services to a vast array of Cisco's networking and collaboration products. The module provides FIPS validated cryptographic algorithms for services such as IPSEC, SRTP, SSH, TLS, x, etc. The module does not directly implement any of these protocols, instead it provides the cryptographic primitives and functions to allow a developer to implement the various protocols."
Certicom Corp.
Explorer Drive
Fourth Floor
Mississauga, Ontario L4W 5L1
Canada

Mike Harvey
TEL:
FAX:

Worldwide Sales & Marketing Headquarters
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP Security Builder FIPS Java Module
(Software Versions: [1], [2], [3])
(When operated in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software12/18/
01/22/1/21/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Sun Java Runtime Environments (JRE) and running on Solaris 10 bit [1, 2]
Solaris 10 bit [1, 2]
Red Hat Linux AS bit [1, 2]
Red Hat Linux AS bit [1, 2]
Windows Vista bit [1, 2]
Windows Vista bit [1, 2]
Windows Server bit [1, 2]
CentOS with Java JRE running on a Dell PowerEdge (single-user mode) [3]

-FIPS Approved algorithms: Triple-DES (Certs. # and #); AES (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); DSA (Certs. # and #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Certs. #52 and #); KAS (Certs. #8, #61 and #62)

-Other algorithms: RNG; ARC2; ARC4; MD2; MD4; MD5; HMAC-MD5; DES; DESX; ECIES; ECQV; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); ECMQV (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); NDRNG
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Security Builder FIPS Java Module is a standards-based cryptographic toolkit written in Java. It supports optimized Elliptic Curve Cryptography and provides application developers with sophisticated tools to flexibly integrate encryption, digital signatures and other security mechanisms into Java-based applications. The Security Builder FIPS Java Module is intended for use by developers who want government level security and can also be used in conjunction with other Certicom developer toolkits including Security Builder PKI and Security Builder SSL."
Harris Corporation
University Avenue
Rochester, NY, NY
USA

Michael Vickers
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP Harris AES Load Module
(Firmware Version: R06A02)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Firmware12/18/12/17/Overall Level: 1

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Blackfin BF DSP with Harris BIOS kernel v1

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); KTS (AES Cert. #)

Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Harris AES Load Module is a firmware module which support to secure voice and data communications by providing Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm encryption/decryption as specified in FIPS It interacts with a Digital Signal Processor (DSP) application executing on the Harris XL family of radios and other terminal products in order to provide its services to those terminals."
BlackBerry Limited
University Avenue East
Waterloo, Ontario N2K OA7
Canada

Security Certifications Team
TEL: ext
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP BlackBerry Cryptographic Java Module
(Software Versions: [1], [2], [3])
(When operated in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software12/18/
01/22/1/21/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Sun Java Runtime Environments (JRE) and running on Solaris 10 bit [1, 2]
Solaris 10 bit [1, 2]
Red Hat Linux AS bit [1, 2]
Red Hat Linux AS bit [1, 2]
Windows Vista bit [1, 2]
Windows Vista bit [1, 2]
Windows Server bit [1, 2]
CentOS with Java JRE running on a Dell PowerEdge (single-user mode) [3]

-FIPS Approved algorithms: Triple-DES (Certs. # and #); AES (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); DSA (Certs. # and #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Certs. #52 and #); KAS (Certs. #8, #61 and #62)

-Other algorithms: RNG; ARC2; ARC4; MD2; MD4; MD5; HMAC-MD5; DES; DESX; ECIES; ECQV; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); ECMQV (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); NDRNG;
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"BlackBerry is the leading wireless enterprise solution that allows users to stay connected with secure, wireless access to email, corporate data, phone, web and organizer features. BlackBerry is a totally integrated package that includes hardware, software and service, providing a complete end-to-end solution. The BlackBerry Cryptographic Java Module is a software module that provides cryptographic services to BlackBerryproducts such as the BlackBerry PlayBook Administration Service, and other BlackBerry products."
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
Compaq Center Drive West
Houston, TX
USA

Julie Ritter
TEL:

Fred Bertram
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP HP BladeSystem c-Class Virtual Connect Module
(Firmware Version: )
(When installed, initialized and configured as specified in Section of the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Firmware12/18/12/17/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 2
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): HP Virtual Connect Flex/10D Blade
HP Virtual Connect Flex 10Gb Ethernet Blade
HP Virtual Connect FlexFabric 10Gb/Port Blade
HP Virtual Connect FlexFabric 20/40 F8 Blade

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); NDRNG; OpenSSL md_rand
Multi-Chip Embedded

"Virtual Connect implements server edge virtualization between the server and data center infrastructure allowing networks to communicate with individual servers or pools of HP BladeSystem server blades. Virtual Connect simplifies the setup and administration of server LAN and SAN connections."
SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC
Suite D, Box Hill Corporate Center Drive
Abingdon, Maryland
USA

Shawn Campbell
TEL:

Bill Becker
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Luna® G5 Cryptographic Module
(Hardware Versions: LTK, Version Code ; Firmware Versions: and )
(When operated in FIPS mode and initialized to Overall Level 3 per Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/18/12/17/Overall Level: 3

-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Certs. # and #, vendor affirmed); DSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); KAS (Cert. #44); KBKDF (Cert. #15)

-Other algorithms: DES; RC2; RC4; RC5; CAST5; SEED; ARIA; MD2; MD5; HAS; DES-MAC; RC2-MAC; RC5-MAC; CAST5-MAC; SSL3-MD5-MAC; SSL3-SHA1-MAC; KCDSA; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); HRNG; AES MAC (AES Cert. #; non-compliant); AES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); GENERIC-SECRET generation (non-compliant); SSL PRE-MASTER generation (non-compliant); RSA (non-compliant); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

""Luna® G5 delivers key management in a portable appliance. All key materials are maintained exclusively within the confines of the hardware. The small form-factor and on-board key storage sets the product apart, making it especially attractive to customers who need to physically remove and store the small appliance holding PKI root keys. The appliance directly connects the HSM to the application server via a USB interface."


CST Lab: NVLAP

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software12/18/12/17/Overall Level: 2

Multi-Chip Stand Alone
Aruba a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
Crossman Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA
USA

Steve Weingart
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP Aruba AP, AP, AP, AP, AP and AP Wireless Access Points
(Hardware Versions: APF1, APF1, APF1, APF1, APF1 and APF1 with FIPS kit ; Firmware Versions: ArubaOS FIPS and ArubaOS FIPS)
(When operated in FIPS mode with tamper evident labels installed as indicated in the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/17/
01/15/
07/06/
10/03/10/2/Overall Level: 2

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, #, # and #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. #, #, # and #); KBKDF (Cert. #32); RSA (Certs. #, # and #); SHS (Certs. #, #, #, # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. #, #, # and #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); MD5; NDRNG
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"Aruba's ac Wi-Fi access points operate at gigabit speeds, offering extreme performance for mobile devices. In FIPS mode, Aruba APs in conjunction with a Mobility Controller support the IEEE i/WPA2 client standard along with optional Suite B cryptography. Aruba APs also support wireless intrusion detection/prevention services and wireless mesh topologies."
Cisco Systems, Inc.
West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA
USA

Global Certification Team

CST Lab: NVLAP Cisco Systems , , Wireless LAN Controllers and Cisco Catalyst XL Switch with Wireless Services Module-2 (WiSM2)
(Hardware Versions: (, , with CN56XX) and (XL with WiSM2, CN56XX and one Supervisor Blade: [VS-S2TG, VS-S2TG-XL, VS-SG-3C or VS-SG-3CXL]); Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/16/12/15/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 2
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, #, # and #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); HMAC (Certs. #, #, # and #); KBKDF (Cert. #31); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Certs. #, # and #)

-Other algorithms: AES (Cert. #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); HMAC-MD5; MD5; NDRNG; RC4; Triple-DES (non-compliant)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Cisco Flex and the Series Controllers are highly scalable branch controllers for enterprise, service provider and multisite wireless deployments. The Cisco Series Wireless Controller are used in small to medium-sized enterprises and branch theindy.us Cisco Wireless Service Module-2 (WiSM2) Controller for Cisco Catalyst Series Switches, is a highly scalable and flexible platform that enables systemwide services for mission-critical wireless networking in medium-sized to large enterprises and campus environments."
Dell, Inc.
Great America Parkway
Santa Clara, CA
USA

Srihari Mandava
TEL:

Jeff Yin
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Dell OpenSSL Cryptographic Library
(Software Versions: [1] and [2])
(When operated in FIPS mode)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software12/16/
08/22/
01/30/1/29/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): [1] Dell EMC Networking OS () running on a Dell EMC Networking SON, Dell EMC Networking SON, Dell Networking S, Dell Networking ST, Dell EMC Networking S, Dell Networking S, Dell Networking Z, Dell EMC Networking MXL, Dell PowerEdge M I/O Aggregator, and Dell PowerEdge FN I/O Aggregator [2] Dell EMC Networking OS () and Dell EMC Networking OS () running on a Dell EMC Networking SON, Dell EMC Networking SON, Dell Networking S, Dell Networking ST, Dell EMC Networking S, Dell Networking S, Dell Networking Z, Dell EMC Networking MXL, Dell PowerEdge M I/O Aggregator, Dell PowerEdge FN I/O Aggregator, Dell EMC Networking S, Dell EMC Networking SF, Dell EMC Networking SP, Dell EMC Networking S, Dell EMC Networking SP, Dell EMC Networking SON, Dell EMC Networking ZON, Dell EMC Networking C, Dell EMC Networking ST-ON, and Dell EMC Networking SON (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, # and #); DRBG (Certs. #, # and #); DSA (Certs. #, # and #); HMAC (Certs. #, # and #); RSA (Certs. #, # and #); SHS (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. #, # and #)

-Other algorithms: RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); ECDSA (non-compliant); Hash_DRBG (non-compliant); HMAC_DRBG (non-compliant); ANSI X RNG (non-compliant); Triple-DES CMAC (non-compliant); AES CMAC (non-compliant); AES GCM (non-compliant); AES XTS (non-compliant)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"Dell OpenSSL Cryptographic Library v and v is used within various Dell EMC Networking products, including the S and Z-Series. Dell EMC Networking S and Z-Series are high performance 10/40GbE ToR and Core Fabric switching products designed for highly virtualized Data Centers. These switches are built on top of Dell’s Data Center hardened OS, Dell EMC Networking OS."
Cavium Inc.
N 1st Street
San Jose, CA
USA

Phanikumar Kancharla
TEL:
FAX: n/a

Tejinder Singh
TEL:
FAX: n/a

CST Lab: NVLAP NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family
(Hardware Versions: P/Ns CNLP-NFBE-G, CNLNFBE-G, CNLNFBE-G, CNLNFBE-G, CNLP-NFBE-G, CNNP-NFBE-G, CNNNFBE-G, CNNNFBE-G and CNNNFBE-G; Firmware Versions: CNN35XX-NFBE-FW build 35, CNN35XX-NFBE-FW build 38, CNN35XX-NFBE-FW build 39, CNN35XX-NFBE-FW build 44 or CNN35XX-NFBE-FW build 48)
(When operated in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/15/
02/23/
06/03/
08/19/8/18/Overall Level: 3

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, #, #, # and #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); DSA (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); KAS (Cert. #53); KAS (SP B, vendor affirmed); KBKDF (Cert. #65); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Cert. #); KTS (AES Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); MD5; RC4; PBE
Multi-Chip Embedded

"CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family is a high performance purpose built solution for key management and crypto acceleration compliance to FIPS The module supports flexible key store that can be partitioned up to 32 individually managed and isolated partitions. This is a SRIOV capable PCIe adapter and can be used in virtualization environment to extend services like virtual key management, crypto and TLS offloads to VMs in dedicated I/O channels. This product is suitable for PKI vendors, SSL servers/load balancers."
FireEye, Inc.
McCarthy Ave.
Milipitas, CA
USA

CST Lab: NVLAP FireEye NX Series: NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX
(Hardware Versions: NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX; Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode. When installed, initialized and configured as specified in Section 3 of the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/16/12/15/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); ECDH (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The FireEye Network Threat Prevention Platform identifies and blocks zero-day Web exploits, droppers (binaries), and multi-protocol callbacks to help organizations scale their advanced threat defenses across a range of deployments, from the multi-gigabit headquarters down to remote, branch, and mobile offices. FireEye Network with Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) technology further optimizes spend, substantially reduces false positives, and enables compliance while driving security across known and unknown threats."
FireEye, Inc.
McCarthy Ave.
Milipitas, CA
USA

CST Lab: NVLAP FireEye FX Series: FX, FX
(Hardware Versions: FX, FX; Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode. When installed, initialized and configured as specified in Section 3 of the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/16/12/15/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); ECDH (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); MD5; DES; RC4; HMAC MD5
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The FireEye FX series is a group of threat prevention platforms that protect content against attacks originating in a wide range of file types. Web mail, online file transfer tools, the cloud, and portable file storage devices can introduce malware that can spread to file shares and content repositories. The FireEye FX platform analyzes network file shares and enterprise content management stores to detect and quarantine malware brought in by employees and others that bypass next-generation firewalls, IPS, AV, and gateways."
FireEye, Inc.
McCarthy Ave.
Milipitas, CA
USA

CST Lab: NVLAP FireEye EX Series: EX, EX, EX, EX
(Hardware Versions: EX, EX, EX, EX; Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode. When installed, initialized and configured as specified in Section 3 of the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/16/12/15/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); ECDH (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); MD5; DES; RC4; HMAC MD5
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The FireEye EX series secures against advanced email attacks. As part of the FireEye Threat Prevention Platform, the FireEye EX uses signature-less technology to analyze every email attachment and successfully quarantine spear-phishing emails used in advanced targeted attacks."
FireEye, Inc.
McCarthy Ave.
Milipitas, CA
USA

CST Lab: NVLAP FireEye CM Series: CM, CM, CM
(Hardware Versions: CM, CM, CM; Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode. When installed, initialized and configured as specified in Section 3 of the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/16/12/15/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); ECDH (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); MD5; DES; RC4; HMAC-MD5; NDRNG
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The FireEye CM series is a group of management platforms that consolidates the administration, reporting, and data sharing of the FireEye NX, EX, FX and AX series in one easy-to-deploy, network-based platform. Within the FireEye deployment, the FireEye CM enables real-time sharing of the auto-generated threat intelligence to identify and block advanced attacks targeting the organization. It also enables centralized configuration, management, and reporting of FireEye platforms."
Cisco Systems, Inc.
West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA
USA

Global Certification Team

CST Lab: NVLAP Cisco Catalyst , E, , E Switches with Wireless Services Module-2 (WiSM2)
(Hardware Versions: (, E, and E) with WiSM2, CN56XX, WS-X6K-SLOT-CVR-E, WS-SVCWISM2FIPKIT= , [CVPNFIPS/KIT=, version D0] and one Supervisor Blade: (VS-S2TG, VS-S2TG-XL, VS-SG-3C or VS-SG-3CXL); Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode and with the tamper evident seals and opacity shields installed as indicated in the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/15/12/14/Overall Level: 2

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, #, # and #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); HMAC (Certs. #, #, # and #); KBKDF (Cert. #31); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Certs. #, # and #)

-Other algorithms: AES (Cert. #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); HMAC-MD5; MD5; NDRNG; RC4; Triple-DES (non-compliant)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Cisco Wireless Service Module 2 (WiSM2) Controller for Cisco Catalyst Series Switches, is a highly scalable and flexible platform that enables systemwide services for mission-critical wireless networking in medium-sized to large enterprises and campus environments."
SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC
Suite D, Box Hill Corporate Center Drive
Abingdon, Maryland
USA

Shawn Campbell
TEL:

Bill Becker
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Luna® PCI-E Cryptographic Module and Luna® PCI-E Cryptographic Module for Luna® SA
(Hardware Versions: VBD, Version Code , VBD, Version Code , VBD, Version Code ; Firmware Versions: and )
(When operated in FIPS mode and initialized to Overall Level 3 per Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/15/12/14/Overall Level: 3

-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Certs. #, # and #, vendor affirmed); DSA (Certs. #, # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Certs. #, # and #); KAS (Cert. #43); KBKDF (Cert. #14)

-Other algorithms: DES; RC2; RC4; RC5; CAST5; SEED; ARIA; MD2; MD5; HAS; DES-MAC; RC2-MAC; RC5-MAC; CAST5-MAC; SSL3-MD5-MAC; SSL3-SHA1-MAC; KCDSA; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); HRNG; AES MAC (AES Cert. #; non-compliant); AES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); GENERIC-SECRET generation (non-compliant); SSL PRE-MASTER generation (non-compliant); RSA (non-compliant); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Embedded

""The Luna PCI-e cryptographic module is a multi-chip embedded hardware cryptographic module in the form of a PCI-Express card that typically resides within a custom computing or secure communications appliance. The cryptographic module is contained in its own secure enclosure that provides physical resistance to tampering. The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined to encompass all components inside the secure enclosure on the PCI-e card.""
SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC
Suite D, Box Hill Corporate Center Drive
Abingdon, Maryland
USA

Shawn Campbell
TEL:

Bill Becker
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Luna® PCI-E Cryptographic Module and Luna® PCI-E Cryptographic Module for Luna® SA
(Hardware Versions: VBD, Version Code , VBD, Version Code , VBD, Version Code ; Firmware Versions: and )
(When operated in FIPS mode and initialized to Overall Level 2 per Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/15/12/14/Overall Level: 2

-Physical Security: Level 3
-EMI/EMC: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Certs. #, # and #, vendor affirmed); DSA (Certs. #, # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Certs. #, # and #); KAS (Cert. #43); KBKDF (Cert. #14)

-Other algorithms: DES; RC2; RC4; RC5; CAST5; SEED; ARIA; MD2; MD5; HAS; DES-MAC; RC2-MAC; RC5-MAC; CAST5-MAC; SSL3-MD5-MAC; SSL3-SHA1-MAC; KCDSA; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); HRNG; AES MAC (AES Cert. #; non-compliant); AES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); GENERIC-SECRET generation (non-compliant); SSL PRE-MASTER generation (non-compliant); RSA (non-compliant); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Embedded

""The Luna PCI-e cryptographic module is a multi-chip embedded hardware cryptographic module in the form of a PCI-Express card that typically resides within a custom computing or secure communications appliance. The cryptographic module is contained in its own secure enclosure that provides physical resistance to tampering. The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined to encompass all components inside the secure enclosure on the PCI-e card.""
SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC
Suite D, Box Hill Corporate Center Drive
Abingdon, Maryland
USA

Shawn Campbell
TEL:

Bill Becker
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Luna® G5 Cryptographic Module
(Hardware Versions: LTK, Version Code ; Firmware Versions: and )
(When operated in FIPS mode and initialized to Overall Level 2 per Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/15/12/14/Overall Level: 2

-Physical Security: Level 3
-EMI/EMC: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Certs. # and #, vendor affirmed); DSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); KAS (Cert. #44); KBKDF (Cert. #15)

-Other algorithms: DES; RC2; RC4; RC5; CAST5; SEED; ARIA; MD2; MD5; HAS; DES-MAC; RC2-MAC; RC5-MAC; CAST5-MAC; SSL3-MD5-MAC; SSL3-SHA1-MAC; KCDSA; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); HRNG; AES MAC (AES Cert. #; non-compliant); AES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); GENERIC-SECRET generation (non-compliant); SSL PRE-MASTER generation (non-compliant); RSA (non-compliant); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"Luna® G5 delivers key management in a portable appliance. All key materials are maintained exclusively within the confines of the hardware. The small form-factor and on-board key storage sets the product apart, making it especially attractive to customers who need to physically remove and store the small appliance holding PKI root keys. The appliance directly connects the HSM to the application server via a USB interface."
SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC
Suite D, Box Hill Corporate Center Drive
Abingdon, Maryland
USA

Shawn Campbell
TEL:

Bill Becker
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Luna® Backup HSM Cryptographic Module
(Hardware Versions: LTK, Version Code ; Firmware Versions: and )
(When operated in FIPS mode and initialized to Overall Level 3 per Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/15/12/14/Overall Level: 3

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Certs. # and #, vendor affirmed); DSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); KAS (Cert. #44); KBKDF (Cert. #15)

-Other algorithms: DES; RC2; RC4; RC5; CAST5; SEED; ARIA; MD2; MD5; HAS; DES-MAC; RC2-MAC; RC5-MAC; CAST5-MAC; SSL3-MD5-MAC; SSL3-SHA1-MAC; KCDSA; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); HRNG; AES MAC (AES Cert. #; non-compliant); AES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); GENERIC-SECRET generation (non-compliant); SSL PRE-MASTER generation (non-compliant); RSA (non-compliant); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Luna® Backup HSM Hardware Security Module (HSM) provides the same level of security as the Luna® SA and Luna® PCI-E HSMs in a convenient, small, low-cost form factor. The Luna Backup HSM ensures that sensitive cryptographic material remains strongly protected in hardware even when not being used. One can easily back up and duplicate keys securely to the Luna Backup HSM for safekeeping in case of emergency, failure or disaster."
Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd.
No, Dianyan Road
Yang-Mei
Taoyuan, Taiwan
Republic of China

Yeou-Fuh Kuan
TEL: +
FAX: +

Char-Shin Miou
TEL: + 3
FAX: +

CST Lab: NVLAP HiKey PKI Token
(Hardware Version: HiKeyBK; Firmware Version: HiKey COS V)
(With tamper evident seals and security devices installed as indicated in the Security Policy. No assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/14/
01/22/1/21/Overall Level: 2

-Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces: Level 3
-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-EMI/EMC: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: DRBG (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG; Triple-DES (Cert. #, key wrapping methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength).
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The HiKey token modules are multi-chip standalone implementations of a cryptographic module. The Hikey token modules are USB tokens that adhere to ISO/IEC specifications for Integrated Circuit Chip (ICC) based identification cards."
SUSE, LLC
10 Canal Park, Suite
Cambridge, Massachusetts
USA

Thomas Biege
TEL: +49

Michael Hager
TEL: +49 80

CST Lab: NVLAP SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 - StrongSwan Cryptographic Module
(Software Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode with module SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 - OpenSSL Module validated to FIPS under Cert. # operating in FIPS mode)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software12/14/12/13/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 running on HP ProLiant DLe Gen8 with PAA
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 running on HP ProLiant DLe Gen8 without PAA (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: CVL (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: N/A
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"SUSE StrongSwan is a complete Ipsec implementation for Linux kernel."
SafeLogic Inc.
Hamilton Ave
Suite
Palo Alto, CA
USA

SafeLogic Inside Sales

CST Lab: NVLAP CryptoComplyTM FORMULA moulded case circuit breaker 37 ABB Dealer theindy.usVI MERCANTILE PVT. LTD. Tel: - 40 Email: [email&#;protected] theindy.us Cell: + – FORMULA link in accordance with IEC Standard – FORMULA link is a component of a power distribution system which divides the main power supply over different users – The FORMULA link is characterised on the supply side by a main circuit-breaker which protects the whole distribution FORMULA link - Electrical characteristics Fixed thermal and fixed magnetic MCCB system, and on the load side by smaller sized circuit- breakers, dedicated to the individual users – FORMULA link assembly for total discrimination between upstream and downstream devices FORMULA moulded case circuit breakers FORMULA link frame [A] / Incoming breaker A2 A3 T6 Outgoing breaker A1 A1-A2 A1-A2 Rated operational voltage 50/60 Hz [V] AC AC AC Rated insulation voltage [V] AC AC AC Rated short time withstand current (1s) [KA] 30 40 40 In(A) Poles 16 3 25 32 40 50 63 80 16 4 25 32 40 50 63 80 Ordering Code L.P.(̀ ) 1SDAR1 2, 1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1  1SDAR1  1SDAR1  1SDAR1  3, 1SDAR1 3, 1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1 3, Ordering Code L.P.(̀ ) 1SDAR1 3, 1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1  1SDAR1  1SDAR1  3, 1SDAR1 4, 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1 4, Ordering Code L.P.(̀ ) 1SDAR1 4, 1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1  4, 1SDAR1 5, 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1 5, Ordering Code L.P.(̀ ) 1SDAR1 4, 1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1  5, 1SDAR1 6, 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1 6, A1A Icu = 10KA, Ics = 50%(Icu) A1 TMF A 1B Icu = 18KA, Ics = 50%(Icu) A 1C Icu = 25KA, Ics = 50%(Icu) A 1N Icu = 36KA, Ics = 50%(Icu)  Stock items 1 38 FORMULA moulded case circuit breakers FORMULA moulded case circuit breaker 39 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 ABB Dealer theindy.usVI MERCANTILE PVT. LTD. Tel: - 40 Email: [email&#;protected] theindy.us Cell: + Switches ABB has a wide portfolio of low voltage switches. They are suitable for diverse applications, in motor control centers, in switch boards and as main switches in various equipments and machines. From single to 8 poles and combination switches for change-over, automatic transfer, bypass, reversing etc. Switch-disconnectors 16 – A The switch disconnector is largely used as the main switch in low voltage switchgears for distribution of power, starting and stopping motors and isolating loads during maintenance. The range from 16 to Amps are either base plate or door mounted by snap-on or screw fitting front operated 3, 4, 6 and 8-pole are available as standard. From to Amps the switch disconnectors, also called load break switches, are designed as pole modules and they are available as 1, 2, 3 and 4-pole versions, front or side operated. Switch Disconnector fuses 16 – A The switch disconnector fuese is used as the main switch in low voltage switchgears in industry for distributing power and protecting motors, cables and other devices against short circuits and over loads. The switch disconnector fuses are available for all types of fuse links, DIN, BS, NFC, UL, CSA. The range includes single pole to four pole versions, front- or side-operated. The pole module design enables location of the operating mechanism in any position together with the direction of the terminals giving flexibility to installation in different types of cubicle designs. Change-over and transfer switches 16 – A ABB’s change-over and transfer switches are designed to transfer loads from one power source to another in a wide variety of applications. The range includes switches from 16 to Amperes, which can be operated manually, remotely by using a motor or automatically. ABB’s change-over and transfer switches are tested according to IEC and IEC standards. The switches have ratings in AC31 and AC33 utilization categories, up to V. In motorized switches, the motor operators have a wide voltage operation range. Enclosed switches – A The ABB enclosed switches are suitable for power distribution in factories and buildings, as local motor isolators and as main switches. Each incoming supply shall be provided with a hand operated main switch-disconnector according to the Machine Directive EN and isolate reliably the electrical equipment from the supply. ABB enclosed switches are designed and tested to meet these requirements and complies with IEC 60 The enclosed switches are easy to install and safe to use in industrial, public and residential environments. The indication of the handle is always reliable and lockable in the OFF-position with a standard padlock. ABB’s long experience in switch disconnects guarantees a long and safe use Cam switches 10 – A ABB’s new OC, OM, ON and OL rotary cam switches offer a complete range of cam switches for control, instrumentation and motor starting applications, maximizing the benefits and optimizing your use of assets. The standard cam switches provide you with a variety of functionalities for the most common mounting types and applications with minimum footprint area. 1 40 Switches InLine II - ZLBM/ZHBM ZLBM reduced depth ZHBM 00/ variants (with the additional depth + 32,5mm) makes it possible to slide on one current transformers (CT) at the rear side pr phase. The new InLine II available for: NH00 - 3 / - A / 1- and 3-pole ZLBMP A ZLBMP A ZLBMP A ZLBMP A The InLine II, Fuse Switch Disconnector is available in two different depths ZLBM and ZHBM. The extra depth of the ZHBM has compatible dimensions to equi- valent products in the market. ZLBM / ZHBM ABB flyer Tmax motor protection circuit breakers 23 1 ABB Dealer theindy.usVI MERCANTILE PVT. LTD. Tel: - 40 Email: [email&#;protected] theindy.us Cell: + Tmax motor protection circuit breakers T5 PR DS-I In (A) Poles 3 3 T5N F F Icu = 36KA, Ics = %(Icu) T5S F F Icu = 50KA, Ics = %(Icu) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 55, 1SDAR1 Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 62, 1SDAR1 Icu Ics(Icu) N 36KA % S 50KA % Icu Ics(Icu) N 36KA % S 50KA % H 70KA % Breaking capacity at VAC Breaking capacity at VAC In (A) Poles 3 T6 PR DS-I Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 59, Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 66, Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 81, In (A) Poles 3 T6N F F Icu = 36KA, Ics = %(Icu) T5N F F Icu = 36KA, Ics = %(Icu) T6N E F Icu = 36KA, Ics = %(Icu) T6S F F Icu = 50KA, Ics = %(Icu) T5S F F Icu = 50KA, Ics = %(Icu) T6S E F Icu = 50KA, Ics = %(Icu) T6H F F Icu = 70KA, Ics = %(Icu) T5H F F Icu = 70KA, Ics = %(Icu) T6H E F Icu = 70KA, Ics = %(Icu) Ekip M-LRIU Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 78, Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 85, Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 99, T5 PR DS-I T5N F F Icu = 36KA, Ics = %(Icu) T5S F F Icu = 50KA, Ics = %(Icu) T5H F F Icu = 70KA, Ics = %(Icu) In (A) Poles 3 Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 36, Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 41, Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 48, T5 Ekip M-LRIU T6 In (A) Poles 3 Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 91, Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 98, Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 1,14, T6 PR DS-I In (A) Poles 3 Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 34, Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 37, Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 45, 24 Tmax motor protection circuit breakers 2/17 AF  AF 3-pole contactors Main accessories Ordering details (1) For contactors Auxiliary contacts Order code Pkg qty Weight (1 pce) kg Side-mounted instantaneous auxiliary contact blocks AF AF 1 1 CAL 2 1 1 CALB 2 Mechanical interlock unit AF AF VM19 1 AF AF and AF, AF VM/ 1 AF, AF and AF AF VM/ 1 Terminal shrouds AF AF, with compression lugs LTL 2 AF, AF, with cable clamps LTC 2 AF, AF, with compression lugs LTL 2 AF, AF, with shorting bar or between contactor and TOL/EOL in DOL-starters LTY 1 AF AF, with cable clamps LTC 2 AF AF, with compression lugs LTL 2 AF AF, with shorting bar or between contactor and TOL/EOL in DOL-starters LTY 1 AF AF, for use with extending cable clamps, ATK/2 and OZXB4 LTD 1 For contactors Dimensions Order code Pkg Weight hole Ø mm bar mm qty (1 pce) kg Terminal enlargements AFAF 13 x 3 LW 1 AFAF x 5 LW 1 AFAF 20 x 5 LW 1 Terminal extension AFAF 13 x 3 LX 1 AFAF x 5 LX 1 AFAF 20 x 5 LX 1 (1) For more information, refer to "Accessories" section. For contactors Cable range Order code Pkg qty Weight (1 pce) kg Connector terminal lug kits AFAF MCM ATK 3 AFAF MCM ATK 3 AFAF (2) MCM ATK/2 3 1S FC 10 10 35 V 00 01 VM19 1S FC 10 10 71 V 00 01 CAL 1S FC 10 10 41 V 00 01 LTC 1S FC 10 10 49 V 00 01 LX ABB_main_sectionindd 17 AM 2 ABB

Validated FIPS and FIPS Cryptographic Modules

Cert#Vendor / Pdfelement 6 pro serial key LabCryptographic ModuleModule
TypeValidation
DateSunset
DateLevel / DescriptionFortinet, Inc.
Moodie Drive
Ottawa, ON K2H 8G3
Canada

Alan Kaye
TEL: x
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP FortiManager
(Firmware Version: vbuild (GA))
(When operated in FIPS mode and configured according to the Entropy Token Section of the Security Policy. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy. There is no assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Firmware12/29/12/28/Overall Level: 1

-Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces: Level 3
-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): FortiManagerD with the Fortinet entropy token (part number FTR-ENT-1 )

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); DES; MD5; HMAC-MD5
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The FortiManager OS is a firmware operating system that runs exclusively on Fortinet's FortiManager product family. FortiManager units are PC-based, smart defrag 6.5 serial key 2020 - Activators Patch built appliances."
Aruba a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
Crossman Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA
USA

Steve Weingart
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP Aruba AP and AP Wireless Access Points
(Hardware Versions: APF1 and APF1 with FIPS kit ; Firmware Versions: ArubaOS FIPS and ArubaOS FIPS)
(When operated in FIPS mode with tamper evident labels installed as indicated in the Security Policy.)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/24/
01/15/
07/06/7/5/Overall Level: 2

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. #, # and #); SHS (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #)

-Other OfficeSuite 5.20.37365 Crack With Serial Key Full Download 2021 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); MD5; NDRNG
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"Aruba's ac Wi-Fi access points operate at gigabit speeds, offering extreme performance for mobile devices. In FIPS mode, the AP & support encrypted management and WPA2 tunneled pass through to Aruba Mobility Controllers. Aruba APs also support wireless intrusion detection/prevention services and wireless mesh topologies."
Cisco Systems, Inc.
W Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA
USA

Global Certification Team

CST Lab: NVLAP Cisco Integrated Services Router (ISR) and (with SM-ES3XP, SM-ES3XP, SM-D-ES3XP, PVDM, PVDM, PVDM and PVDM) and Cisco Integrated Services Router (ISR) (with PVDM, PVDM, PVDM and PVDM)
(Hardware Versions: ISR [1], ISR [2] and ISR [3] with SM-ES3XP [1,2], SM-ES3XP [1,2], SM-D-ES3XP [1,2], PVDM [1,2,3], PVDM [1,2,3], PVDM [1,2,3] and PVDM [1,2,3]; Firmware Version: IOS-XE )
(When operated in FIPS mode)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/24/12/23/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: AES (non-compliant); DES; Diffie-Hellman (key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); HMAC-MD5; MD5; NDRNG; RC4; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); KBKDF (non-compliant);
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Integrated Services Router (ISR) are routing platforms that provide comprehensive security services including VPN for small businesses, enterprise small branch and teleworkers. The platforms are architected to enable the next phase of branch-office evolution, providing rich media collaboration and virtualization to the branch while offering a wide-range of connectivity options."
Athena SCS, Inc.
Lark Ave.
Suite
San Jose, CA
USA

Stephanie Motre
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP iEngine SSID Applet on Athena SCS IDProtect Duo for SLE78
(Hardware Version: Infineon SLE78CLFXP P-MCC package; Firmware Version: Athena IDProtect with iEngine SSID Applet V)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/23/12/22/Overall Level: 3

-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); KBKDF (Cert. #59); SHS (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG
Single Chip

"IDProtect is a Cryptographic Module based on the Athena OS Java Card smartcard operating system with KB of Flash. IDProtect is compliant with the latest Java Card and Global Platform specifications. IDProtect supports FIPS approved DRBG, SHA-2, AES, ECDSA and ECC key generation. The SSID Java Card applet of iEngine is an applet supporting the latest version of the SSID standard for high-performance government application."
Hewlett Packard®, Enterprise
Taylor Street
Littleton, MA
USA

Nagesh Kuriyavar
TEL:
FAX:

Paul Rozeboom
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP HP OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module
(Software Version: I-HSS )

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software12/22/12/21/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): HP NonStop v J running on Integrity NonStop BladeSystem NBc (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: N/A
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The HP OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module provides cryptographic services that allows the HP OpenCall HLR to protect sensitive application and subscriber data at rest and during transit"
Toshiba Corporation
, Shibaura 1-chome
Minato-ku
Tokyo, Tokyo
Japan

Tohru Iwamoto
TEL: +

CST Lab: NVLAP Toshiba TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Hard Disk Drive (AL14SEQ model)
(Hardware Versions: A0 with AL14SEQ18EPB, AL14SEQ12EPB, AL14SEQ09EPB, AL14SEQ18EQB, AL14SEQ12EQB, AL14SEQ09EQB; Firmware Version: )

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/22/12/21/Overall Level: 2

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG
Multi-Chip Embedded

"The Toshiba TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Hard Disk Drive is used for hard disk drive data security. This Cryptographic Module (CM) provides various cryptographic services using FIPS approved algorithms. Services include hardware-based data encryption, cryptographic erase, independently protected user data LBA bands, and FW download."
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
R5Maetan 3-dong Yeongton-gu
Suwon-si, Gyeonggi
Korea

Bumhan Kim
TEL: +

CST Lab: NVLAP Samsung Flash Memory Protector V
(Hardware Version: ; Software Version: )

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software-Hybrid12/21/12/20/Overall Level: 1

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Android Lollipop running on Samsung Galaxy S6 (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: N/A
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The driver for the on-the-fly Hardware encryption module to flash memory for Disk/File Encryption solution. The Harware module supports AES with CBC mode and XTS-AES cryptographic services."
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
Compaq Center Drive West
Houston, TX
USA

Catherine Schwartz

CST Lab: NVLAP HP P-Class Smart Array Gen9 RAID Controllers
(Hardware Versions: Pbr, Pbr, P, P, and Pm; Firmware Version: )
(When installed, initialized and configured as specified in the Security Policy Section 3)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Hardware12/21/12/20/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 2
-Design Assurance: Level 2
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); SHS (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping); NDRNG
Multi-Chip Embedded

"The HP P-Class Smart Array RAID Controllers make up a family of serial-attached SCSI host bus adapters that provide intelligent control for storage array. The controllers can be card-based or embedded within an HP server, and provide a high speed data path, on-board storage cache, remote management, and encryption of data at rest, for the controlled storage arrays."
Cisco Systems, Inc.
West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA
USA

Global Certification Team

CST Lab: NVLAP Cisco FIPS Object Module
(Software Version: )
(When installed, initialized and configured as specified in the Security Policy Section and operated in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy.)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software12/21/12/20/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Linux running on an Octeon Evaluation Board CN on a Cisco WLC without Octeon
Linux running on an Octeon Evaluation Board CN on a Cisco WLC with Octeon
Linux running on an Intel Xeon on a Cisco UCS C22 M3
Android v running on a Qualcomm Snapdragon Pro APQ ARMv7 on a Google Nexus 4
Windows running on an Intel Core i7 on a Gateway FX without PAA
Windows running on an Intel Core i7 on a Gateway FX with PAA
FreeBSD running on an Intel Xeon on a Cisco UCS C M2 (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); CVL (Certs. #, #, # and #); DRBG (Certs. # and #); DSA (Certs. # and #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); KBKDF (Certs. #52 and #53); RSA (Certs. Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Cisco FIPS Object Module (FOM) is a software library that provides cryptographic services to a vast array of Cisco's networking and collaboration products. The module provides FIPS validated cryptographic algorithms for services such as IPSEC, SRTP, SSH, TLS, x, etc. The module does not directly implement any of these protocols, instead it provides the cryptographic primitives and functions to allow a developer to implement the various protocols."
Certicom Corp.
Explorer Drive
Fourth Floor
Mississauga, Ontario L4W 5L1
Canada

Mike Harvey
TEL:
FAX:

Worldwide Sales & Marketing Headquarters
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP Security Builder FIPS Java Module
(Software Versions: [1], [2], [3])
(When operated in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software12/18/
01/22/1/21/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Sun Java Runtime Environments (JRE) and running on Solaris 10 bit [1, 2]
Solaris 10 bit [1, 2]
Red Hat Linux AS bit [1, 2]
Red Hat Linux AS bit [1, 2]
Windows Vista bit [1, 2]
Windows Vista bit [1, 2]
Windows Server bit [1, 2]
CentOS with Java JRE running on a Dell PowerEdge (single-user mode) [3]

-FIPS Approved algorithms: Triple-DES (Certs. # and #); AES (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); DSA (Certs. # and #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Certs. #52 and #); KAS (Certs. #8, #61 and #62)

-Other algorithms: RNG; ARC2; ARC4; MD2; MD4; MD5; HMAC-MD5; DES; DESX; ECIES; Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); ECMQV (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); NDRNG
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Security Builder FIPS Java Module is a standards-based cryptographic toolkit written in Java. It supports optimized Elliptic Curve Cryptography and provides application developers with sophisticated tools to flexibly integrate encryption, digital signatures and other security mechanisms into Java-based applications. The Security Builder FIPS Java Module is intended for use by developers who want government level security and can also be used in conjunction with other Certicom developer toolkits including Security Builder PKI and Security Builder SSL."
Harris Corporation
University Avenue
Rochester, NY, NY
USA

Michael Vickers
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP Harris AES Load Module
(Firmware Version: R06A02)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Firmware12/18/12/17/Overall Level: 1

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Blackfin BF DSP with Harris BIOS kernel v1

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); KTS (AES Cert. #)

Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Harris AES Load Module is a firmware module which support to secure voice and data communications by providing Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm encryption/decryption as specified in FIPS It interacts with a Digital Signal Processor (DSP) application executing on the Harris XL family of radios and other terminal products in order to provide its services to those terminals."
BlackBerry Limited
University Avenue East
Waterloo, Ontario N2K OA7
Canada

Security Certifications Team
TEL: ext
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP BlackBerry Cryptographic Java Module
(Software Versions: [1], [2], [3])
(When operated in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software12/18/
01/22/1/21/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Sun Java Runtime Environments (JRE) and running on Solaris 10 bit [1, 2]
Solaris 10 bit [1, 2]
Red Hat Linux AS bit [1, 2]
Red Hat Linux AS bit [1, 2]
Windows Vista bit [1, 2]
Windows Vista bit [1, 2]
Windows Server bit [1, 2]
CentOS with Java JRE running on a Dell PowerEdge (single-user mode) [3]

-FIPS Approved algorithms: Triple-DES (Certs. # and #); AES (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); DSA (Certs. # and #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Certs. #52 and #); KAS (Certs. #8, #61 and #62)

-Other algorithms: RNG; ARC2; ARC4; MD2; MD4; MD5; HMAC-MD5; DES; DESX; ECIES; ECQV; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); ECMQV (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); NDRNG;
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"BlackBerry is the leading wireless enterprise solution that allows users to stay connected with secure, wireless access to email, corporate data, phone, web and organizer features. BlackBerry is a totally integrated package that includes hardware, software and service, providing a complete end-to-end solution. The BlackBerry Cryptographic Java Module is windows repair toolbox portable - Crack Key For U software module that provides cryptographic services to BlackBerryproducts such as the BlackBerry PlayBook Administration Service, and other BlackBerry products."
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
Compaq Center Drive West
Houston, TX
USA

Julie Ritter
TEL:

Fred Bertram
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP HP BladeSystem c-Class Virtual Connect Module
(Firmware Version: )
(When installed, initialized and configured as specified in Section of the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Firmware12/18/12/17/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 2
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): HP Virtual Connect Flex/10D Blade
HP Virtual Connect Flex 10Gb Ethernet Blade
HP Virtual Connect FlexFabric 10Gb/Port Blade
HP Virtual Connect FlexFabric 20/40 F8 Blade

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); NDRNG; OpenSSL md_rand
Multi-Chip Embedded

"Virtual Connect implements server edge virtualization between the server and data center infrastructure allowing networks to communicate with individual servers or pools of HP BladeSystem server blades. Virtual Connect simplifies the setup and administration of server LAN and SAN connections."
SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC
Suite D, Box Hill Corporate Center Drive
Abingdon, Maryland
USA

Shawn Campbell
TEL:

Bill Becker
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Luna® G5 Cryptographic Module
(Hardware Versions: LTK, Version Code ; Firmware Versions: and )
(When operated in FIPS mode and initialized to Overall Level 3 per Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/18/12/17/Overall Level: 3

-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Certs. # and #, vendor affirmed); DSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); KAS (Cert. #44); KBKDF (Cert. #15)

-Other algorithms: DES; RC2; RC4; RC5; CAST5; SEED; ARIA; MD2; MD5; HAS; DES-MAC; RC2-MAC; RC5-MAC; CAST5-MAC; SSL3-MD5-MAC; SSL3-SHA1-MAC; KCDSA; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); HRNG; AES MAC (AES Cert. #; non-compliant); AES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); GENERIC-SECRET generation (non-compliant); SSL PRE-MASTER generation (non-compliant); RSA (non-compliant); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

""Luna® G5 delivers key management in a portable appliance. All key materials are maintained exclusively within the confines of the hardware. The small form-factor and on-board key storage sets the product apart, making it especially attractive to customers who need to physically remove and store the small appliance holding PKI root keys. The appliance directly connects the HSM to the application server via a USB interface."


CST Lab: NVLAP

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software12/18/12/17/Overall Level: 2

Multi-Chip Stand Alone
Aruba a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
Crossman Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA
USA

Steve Weingart
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP Aruba AP, AP, AP, AP, AP and AP Wireless Access Points
(Hardware Versions: APF1, APF1, APF1, APF1, APF1 and APF1 with FIPS kit ; Firmware Versions: ArubaOS FIPS and ArubaOS FIPS)
(When operated in FIPS mode with tamper evident labels installed as indicated in the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/17/
01/15/
07/06/
10/03/10/2/Overall Level: 2

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, #, # and #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. #, #, # and #); KBKDF (Cert. #32); RSA (Certs. #, # and #); SHS (Certs. #, #, #, # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. #, #, # and #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); MD5; NDRNG
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"Aruba's ac Wi-Fi access points operate at gigabit speeds, offering extreme performance Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 mobile devices. In FIPS mode, Aruba APs in conjunction with a Mobility Controller support the IEEE i/WPA2 client standard along with optional Suite B cryptography. Aruba APs also support wireless intrusion detection/prevention services and wireless mesh topologies."
Cisco Systems, Inc.
West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA
USA

Global Certification Team

CST Lab: NVLAP Cisco Systems, Wireless LAN Controllers and Cisco Catalyst XL Switch with Wireless Services Module-2 (WiSM2)
(Hardware Versions: (,with CN56XX) and (XL with WiSM2, CN56XX and one Supervisor Blade: [VS-S2TG, VS-S2TG-XL, VS-SG-3C or VS-SG-3CXL]); Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/16/12/15/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 2
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, #, # and #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); HMAC (Certs. #, #, # and #); KBKDF (Cert. #31); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Certs. #, # and #)

-Other algorithms: AES (Cert. #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); HMAC-MD5; MD5; NDRNG; RC4; Triple-DES (non-compliant)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Cisco Flex and the Series Controllers are highly scalable branch controllers for enterprise, service provider and multisite wireless deployments. The Cisco Series Wireless Controller are used in small to medium-sized enterprises and branch theindy.us Cisco Wireless Service Module-2 (WiSM2) Controller for Cisco Catalyst Series Switches, is a highly scalable and flexible platform that enables systemwide services for mission-critical wireless networking in medium-sized to large enterprises and campus environments."
Dell, Inc.
Great America Parkway
Santa Clara, CA
USA

Srihari Mandava
TEL:

Jeff Yin
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Dell OpenSSL Cryptographic Library
(Software Versions: [1] and [2])
(When operated in FIPS mode)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software12/16/
08/22/
01/30/1/29/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): [1] Dell EMC Networking OS () running on a Dell EMC Networking SON, Dell EMC Networking SON, Dell Networking S, Dell Networking ST, Dell EMC Networking S, Dell Networking S, Dell Networking Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021, Dell EMC Networking MXL, Dell PowerEdge M I/O Aggregator, and Dell PowerEdge FN I/O Aggregator [2] Dell EMC Networking OS () and Dell EMC Networking OS () running on a Dell EMC Networking SON, Dell EMC Networking SON, Dell Networking S, Dell Networking ST, Dell EMC Networking S, Dell Networking S, Dell Networking Z, Dell EMC Networking MXL, Dell PowerEdge M I/O Aggregator, Dell PowerEdge FN I/O Aggregator, Dell EMC Networking S, Dell EMC Networking SF, Dell EMC Networking SP, Dell EMC Networking S, Dell EMC Networking SP, Dell EMC Networking SON, Dell EMC Networking ZON, Dell EMC Networking C, Dell EMC Networking ST-ON, and Dell EMC Networking SON (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, # and #); DRBG (Certs. #, # and #); DSA (Certs. #, # and #); HMAC (Certs. #, # and #); RSA (Certs. #, # and #); SHS (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. #, # and #)

-Other algorithms: RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); ECDSA (non-compliant); Hash_DRBG (non-compliant); HMAC_DRBG (non-compliant); ANSI X RNG (non-compliant); Triple-DES CMAC (non-compliant); AES CMAC (non-compliant); AES GCM (non-compliant); AES XTS (non-compliant)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"Dell OpenSSL Cryptographic Library v and v is used within various Dell EMC Networking products, including the S and Z-Series. Dell EMC Networking S and Z-Series are high performance 10/40GbE ToR and Core Fabric switching products designed for highly virtualized Data Centers. These switches are built on top of Dell’s Data Center hardened OS, Dell EMC Networking OS."
Cavium Inc.
N 1st Street
San Jose, CA
USA

Phanikumar Kancharla
TEL:
FAX: n/a

Tejinder Singh
TEL:
FAX: n/a

CST Lab: NVLAP NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family
(Hardware Versions: P/Ns CNLP-NFBE-G, CNLNFBE-G, CNLNFBE-G, CNLNFBE-G, CNLP-NFBE-G, CNNP-NFBE-G, CNNNFBE-G, CNNNFBE-G and CNNNFBE-G; Firmware Versions: CNN35XX-NFBE-FW build 35, CNN35XX-NFBE-FW build 38, CNN35XX-NFBE-FW build 39, CNN35XX-NFBE-FW build 44 or CNN35XX-NFBE-FW build 48)
(When operated in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/15/
02/23/
06/03/
08/19/8/18/Overall Level: 3

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, #, #, # and #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); DSA (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); KAS (Cert. #53); KAS (SP B, vendor affirmed); KBKDF (Cert. #65); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Cert. #); KTS (AES Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); MD5; RC4; PBE
Multi-Chip Embedded

"CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family is a high performance purpose built solution for key management and crypto acceleration compliance to FIPS The module supports flexible key store that can be partitioned up to 32 individually managed and isolated partitions. This is a SRIOV capable PCIe adapter and can be used in virtualization environment Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 extend services like virtual key management, crypto and TLS offloads to VMs in dedicated I/O channels. This product is suitable for PKI vendors, SSL servers/load balancers."
FireEye, Inc.
McCarthy Ave.
Milipitas, CA
USA

CST Lab: NVLAP FireEye NX Series: NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX
(Hardware Versions: NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX, NX; Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode. When installed, initialized and configured as specified in Section 3 of the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/16/12/15/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); ECDH (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The FireEye Network Threat Prevention Platform identifies and blocks zero-day Web exploits, droppers (binaries), and multi-protocol callbacks to help organizations scale their advanced threat defenses across a range of deployments, from the multi-gigabit headquarters down to remote, branch, and mobile offices. FireEye Network with Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) technology further optimizes spend, substantially reduces false positives, and enables compliance while driving security across known and unknown threats."
FireEye, Inc.
McCarthy Ave.
Milipitas, CA
USA

CST Lab: NVLAP FireEye FX Series: FX, FX
(Hardware Versions: FX, FX; Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode. When installed, initialized and configured as specified in Section 3 of the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/16/12/15/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); ECDH (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); MD5; DES; RC4; HMAC MD5
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The FireEye FX series is a group of threat prevention platforms that protect content against attacks originating in a wide range of file types. Web mail, online file transfer tools, the cloud, and portable file storage devices can introduce malware that can spread to file shares and content repositories. The FireEye FX platform analyzes network file shares and enterprise content management stores to detect and quarantine malware brought in by employees and others that bypass next-generation firewalls, IPS, AV, and gateways."
FireEye, Inc.
McCarthy Ave.
Milipitas, CA
USA

CST Lab: NVLAP FireEye EX Series: EX, EX, EX, EX
(Hardware Versions: EX, EX, EX, EX; Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode. When installed, initialized and configured as specified in Section 3 of the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/16/12/15/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); ECDH (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); MD5; DES; RC4; HMAC MD5
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The FireEye EX series secures against advanced email attacks. As part of the FireEye Threat Prevention Platform, the FireEye EX uses signature-less technology to analyze every email attachment and successfully quarantine spear-phishing emails used in advanced targeted attacks."
FireEye, Inc.
McCarthy Ave.
Milipitas, CA
USA

CST Lab: NVLAP FireEye CM Series: CM, CM, CM
(Hardware Versions: CM, CM, CM; Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode. When installed, initialized and configured as specified in Section 3 of the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation ExpressVPN Free Activate Policy
Hardware12/16/12/15/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); ECDH (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); MD5; DES; RC4; HMAC-MD5; NDRNG
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The FireEye CM series is a group of management platforms that consolidates the administration, reporting, and data sharing of the FireEye NX, EX, FX and AX series in one easy-to-deploy, network-based platform. Within the FireEye deployment, the FireEye CM enables real-time sharing of the auto-generated threat intelligence to identify and block advanced attacks targeting the organization. It also enables centralized configuration, management, and reporting of FireEye platforms."
Cisco Systems, Inc.
West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA
USA

Global Certification Team

CST Lab: NVLAP Cisco CatalystE,E Switches with Wireless Services Module-2 (WiSM2)
(Hardware Versions: (, E, and E) with WiSM2, CN56XX, WS-X6K-SLOT-CVR-E, WS-SVCWISM2FIPKIT=[CVPNFIPS/KIT=, version D0] and one Supervisor Blade: (VS-S2TG, VS-S2TG-XL, VS-SG-3C or VS-SG-3CXL); Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode and with the tamper evident seals and opacity shields installed as indicated in the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/15/12/14/Overall Level: 2

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, #, # and #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); HMAC (Certs. #, #, # and #); KBKDF (Cert. #31); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Certs. #, # and #)

-Other algorithms: AES (Cert. #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); HMAC-MD5; MD5; NDRNG; RC4; Triple-DES (non-compliant)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Cisco Wireless Service Module 2 (WiSM2) Controller for Cisco Catalyst Series Switches, is a highly scalable and flexible platform that enables systemwide services for mission-critical wireless networking in medium-sized to large enterprises and campus environments."
SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC
Suite D, Box Hill Corporate Center Drive
Abingdon, Maryland
USA

Shawn Campbell
TEL:

Bill Becker
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Luna® PCI-E Cryptographic Module and Luna® PCI-E Cryptographic Module for Luna® SA
(Hardware Versions: VBD, Version CodeVBD, Version CodeVBD, Version Code ; Firmware Versions: and )
(When operated in FIPS mode and initialized to Overall Level 3 per Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/15/12/14/Overall Level: 3

-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Certs. #, # and #, vendor affirmed); DSA (Certs. #, # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Certs. #, # and #); KAS (Cert. #43); KBKDF (Cert. #14)

-Other algorithms: DES; RC2; RC4; RC5; CAST5; SEED; ARIA; MD2; MD5; HAS; DES-MAC; RC2-MAC; RC5-MAC; CAST5-MAC; SSL3-MD5-MAC; SSL3-SHA1-MAC; KCDSA; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); HRNG; AES MAC (AES Cert. #; non-compliant); AES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); GENERIC-SECRET generation (non-compliant); SSL PRE-MASTER generation (non-compliant); RSA (non-compliant); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Embedded

""The Luna PCI-e cryptographic module is a multi-chip tipard video converter ultimate portable - Activators Patch hardware cryptographic module in the form of a PCI-Express card that typically resides within a custom computing or secure communications appliance. The cryptographic module is contained in its own secure enclosure that provides physical resistance to tampering. The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined to encompass all components inside the secure enclosure on the PCI-e card.""
SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC
Suite D, Box Hill Corporate Center Drive
Abingdon, Maryland
USA

Shawn Campbell
TEL:

Bill Becker
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Luna® PCI-E Cryptographic Module and Luna® PCI-E Cryptographic Module for Luna® SA
(Hardware Versions: VBD, Version CodeVBD, Version CodeVBD, Version Code ; Firmware Versions: and )
(When operated in FIPS mode and initialized to Overall Level 2 per Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/15/12/14/Overall Level: 2

-Physical Security: Level 3
-EMI/EMC: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Certs. #, # and #, vendor affirmed); DSA (Certs. #, # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Certs. #, # and #); KAS (Cert. #43); KBKDF (Cert. #14)

-Other algorithms: DES; RC2; RC4; RC5; CAST5; SEED; ARIA; MD2; MD5; HAS; DES-MAC; RC2-MAC; RC5-MAC; CAST5-MAC; SSL3-MD5-MAC; SSL3-SHA1-MAC; KCDSA; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); HRNG; AES MAC (AES Cert. #; non-compliant); AES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); GENERIC-SECRET generation (non-compliant); SSL PRE-MASTER generation (non-compliant); RSA (non-compliant); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Embedded

""The Luna PCI-e cryptographic module is a multi-chip embedded hardware cryptographic module in the form of a PCI-Express card that typically resides within a custom computing or secure communications appliance. The cryptographic module is contained in its own secure enclosure that provides physical resistance to tampering. The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined to encompass all components inside the secure enclosure on the PCI-e card.""
SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC
Suite D, Box Hill Corporate Center Drive
Abingdon, Maryland
USA

Shawn Campbell
TEL:

Bill Becker
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Luna® G5 Cryptographic Module
(Hardware Versions: LTK, Version Code ; Firmware Versions: and )
(When operated in FIPS mode and initialized to Overall Level 2 per Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/15/12/14/Overall Level: 2

-Physical Security: Level 3
-EMI/EMC: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Certs. # and #, vendor affirmed); DSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); KAS (Cert. #44); KBKDF (Cert. #15)

-Other algorithms: DES; RC2; RC4; RC5; CAST5; SEED; ARIA; MD2; MD5; HAS; DES-MAC; RC2-MAC; RC5-MAC; CAST5-MAC; SSL3-MD5-MAC; SSL3-SHA1-MAC; KCDSA; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); HRNG; AES MAC (AES Cert. #; non-compliant); AES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); GENERIC-SECRET generation (non-compliant); SSL PRE-MASTER generation (non-compliant); RSA (non-compliant); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"Luna® G5 delivers key management in a portable appliance. All key materials are maintained exclusively within the confines of the hardware. The small form-factor and on-board key storage sets the product apart, making it especially attractive to customers who need to physically remove and store the small appliance holding PKI root keys. The appliance directly connects the HSM to the application server via a USB interface."
SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC
Suite D, Box Hill Corporate Center Drive
Abingdon, Maryland
USA

Shawn Campbell
TEL:

Bill Becker
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Luna® Backup HSM Cryptographic Module
(Hardware Versions: LTK, Version Code ; Firmware Versions: and )
(When operated in FIPS mode and initialized to Overall Level 3 per Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/15/12/14/Overall Level: 3

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Certs. # and #, vendor affirmed); DSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); KAS (Cert. #44); KBKDF (Cert. #15)

-Other algorithms: DES; RC2; RC4; RC5; CAST5; SEED; ARIA; MD2; MD5; HAS; DES-MAC; RC2-MAC; RC5-MAC; CAST5-MAC; SSL3-MD5-MAC; SSL3-SHA1-MAC; KCDSA; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); HRNG; AES MAC (AES Cert. #; non-compliant); AES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); GENERIC-SECRET generation (non-compliant); SSL PRE-MASTER generation (non-compliant); RSA (non-compliant); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Luna® Backup HSM Hardware Security Module (HSM) provides the same level of security as the Luna® SA and Luna® PCI-E HSMs in a convenient, small, low-cost form factor. The Luna Backup HSM ensures that sensitive cryptographic material remains strongly protected in hardware even when not being used. One can easily back up and duplicate keys securely to the Luna Backup HSM for safekeeping in case of emergency, failure or disaster."
Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd.
No, Dianyan Road
Yang-Mei autodesk serial number, Taiwan
Republic of China

Yeou-Fuh Kuan
TEL: +
FAX: +

Char-Shin Miou
TEL: + 3
FAX: +

CST Lab: NVLAP HiKey PKI Token
(Hardware Version: HiKeyBK; Firmware Version: HiKey COS V)
(With tamper evident seals and security devices installed as indicated in the Security Policy. No assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/14/
01/22/1/21/Overall Level: 2

-Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces: Level 3
-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-EMI/EMC: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: DRBG (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG; Triple-DES (Cert. #, key wrapping methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength).
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The HiKey token modules are multi-chip standalone implementations of a cryptographic module. The Hikey token modules are USB tokens that adhere to ISO/IEC specifications for Integrated Circuit Chip (ICC) based identification cards."
SUSE, LLC
10 Canal Park, Suite
Cambridge, Massachusetts
USA

Thomas Biege
TEL: +49

Michael Hager
TEL: +49 80

CST Lab: NVLAP SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 - StrongSwan Cryptographic Module
(Software Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode with module SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 - OpenSSL Module validated to FIPS under Cert. # operating in FIPS mode)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software12/14/12/13/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 running on HP ProLiant DLe Gen8 with PAA
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 running on HP ProLiant DLe Gen8 without PAA (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved endnote x8 1 product key - Free Activators CVL (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: N/A
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"SUSE StrongSwan is a complete Ipsec implementation for Linux kernel."
SafeLogic Inc.
Hamilton Ave
Suite
Palo Alto, CA
USA

SafeLogic Inside Sales

CST Lab: NVLAP CryptoComplyTM Protection and connection ABB Dealer theindy.usVI MERCANTILE PVT. LTD. Tel: - 40 Email: [email&#;protected] theindy.us Cell: + OFF HRC fuse links and base, BS-type BS -type fuse links, gG, V, 80 kA The type code includes one fuse link, but the delivery batch is according to the column. Fuse size Rated current In [A] Description Delivery batch [pcs] L.P. P. (`) F1 20 Control Fuse Base 1SYNR  32 1SYNR   Stock items 1 Protection and connection DC switch disconnectors for PV application 41 ABB Dealer theindy.usVI MERCANTILE PVT. LTD. Tel: - 40 Email: [email&#;protected] theindy.us Cell: + Fusegear Easyline - XLP Fuse Switch Disconnector 1, 2, 3 & 4P for both AC and DC application A Features – All the XLP cable terminals can be delivered with integrated bolts for cable lugs or with integrated bridge clamps (BC) for easy direct cable connection. – Typetested according to EN – Easy to recycle / EN standards – Quick-make operation device – Integrated IP20 cable termination – IP30 degree of protection from the front – Replacement compatible to similar types in the market – Voltage measuring from the front – V-0 plastic materials Advantages – Easy to install – Easy to operate – Sturdy design – High personal safety – Wide range of cable terminals and snap-on accessories – Compact, add-on Electronic Fuse Monitoring (EFM) – Busbar adapters Applications – UPS: Uninterruptible Power Supply, used for the power supply for computer/servers, storage devices, communication network systems, industry control systems, etc. – Telecom Power Supplies. – General protection in Hot Virtual Keyboard Registration key distribution panels using 1-pole or 2-pole configurations AC or DC. All units are applicable for AC Voltage, and the 1-pole and 2-pole range are also rated for DC voltage. In addition to Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 used as single apparatus, the 3-pole range from size 00 to size 3 (A - A) are also designed to be used in distribution systems by use of a busbar adapter for easy installation. The Busbar adapters are available for 40mm, and 60mm distance in-between centre of the phases for each busbarsystems. The whole EasyLine range got a sturdy, uniform design that is operator friendly and Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 with IP 30 from front in closed position and IP 20 in open position. EasyLine Fuse Switch Disconnectors are developed and type tested according to IEC and based on a long history, going back to when we successfully introduced the manually dependent operated LHB. Description Ordering Code L.P. (`) XLPP-2BC 1SEPR Upon request XLPP-2BC 1SEPR XLPP-2BC 1SEPR XLPP-2BC 1SEPR Description Ordering Code L.P. (`) XLPP-4BC 1SEPR Upon request XLPP-4BC 1SEPR XLPP-4BC 1SEPR XLPP-4BC 1SEPR Description Ordering Code L.P. (`) XLPBC 1SEPR Upon request XLPBC 1SEPR XLPBC 1SEPR XLPBC 1SEPR Description Ordering Code L.P. (`) XLPP-8BC 1SEPR Upon request XLPP-8BC 1SEPR XLPP-8BC 1SEPR XLPP-8BC 1SEPR *For information contact our nearest sales office 1 42 Fusegear Tmax accessories 27 1 ABB Dealer theindy.usVI MERCANTILE PVT. LTD. Tel: - 40 Email: [email&#;protected] theindy.us Cell: + Tmax accessories Electrical signals Auxillary Contact - AUX Frame Description Ordering code L.P.(`) TT6(1) AUX 1Q 1SY V AC/DC TT6 (1) 1SDAR1  1, AUX 3Q 1SY V AC/DC TT6 (1) 1SDAR1  2, AUX 3Q 1SY 24V DC TT6 (1) 1SDAR1 2, T4-T5 AUX-SA 1 S51 T4-T5 1SDAR1 1, T7M-X1 AUX 2Q 24V DC T7M-X1 1SDAR1 AUX 2Q V AC T7M-X1 1SDAR1 T7M-X1 AUX SA T7M-X1 S51 24VDC 1SDAR1 6, AUX SA T7M-X1 S51 VAC 1SDAR1 T7 AUX 1Q + 1SY 24V DC T7 1SDAR1 2, AUX 1Q + 1SY V AC T7 1SDAR1 Auxilary Contact Cabled-Version - AUX - C Frame Description Ordering code L.P.(`) T1-T2-T3 (1) AUX-C 1Q 1SY V AC/DC T1-T2-T3 (1) 1SDAR1 2, AUX-C 3Q 1SY V AC/DC T1-T2-T3 (1) 1SDAR1 3, AUX-C 3Q 1SY T1-T2-T3 (1) 1SDAR1 3, T2 AUX-C 1Q 1SY 1S51 - PR T2 1SDAR1  2, AUX-C 2Q 1SY - PR T2 1SDAR1 2, T4-T5-T6 AUX-C 1Q 1SY V AC/DC C T4-T5-T6 1SDAR1 2, AUX-C 1Q 1SY V AC C T4-T5-T6 1SDAR1 2, AUX-C 2Q V AC C T4-T5-T6 1SDAR1 3, AUX-C 3Q 1SY 24VDC C T4-T5-T6 1SDAR1 3, AUX-C 3Q 1SY V AC/DC C T4-T5-T6 1SDAR1 3, Note (1): Cannot be used with T2 MCCB fitted with PRDS trip unit Note: For T7 TM in Withdrable Version Sliding Contact Blocks for Fixed and moving Part are Necessary Opening release Shunt Opening Release - SOR Frame Description Ordering code L.P.(`) T1-T2-T3 SOR 12V DC T1-T2-T3 1SDAR1 1, SOR V AC/DC T1-T2-T3 1SDAR1 SOR 48…60V AC/DC T1-T2-T3 1SDAR1 SOR …V AC…V DC T1-T2-T3 1SDAR1 SOR …V AC…V DC T1-T2-T3 1SDAR1  SOR …V AC T1-T2-T3 1SDAR1 SOR …V AC T1-T2-T3 1SDAR1 T4-T5-T6 SOR 12V DC T4-T5-T6 1SDAR1 3, SOR 24V AC/DC T4-T5-T6 1SDAR1 SOR V AC/DC T4-T5-T6 1SDAR1 SOR V ACV DC T4-T5-T6 1SDAR1 SOR V ACV DC T4-T5-T6 1SDAR1  SOR V AC T4-T5-T6 1SDAR1 SOR V AC T4-T5-T6 1SDAR1 T7-T7M-X1 SOR 24V AC/DC T7-T7M-X1 1SDAR1 5, SOR 30V AC/DC T7-T7M-X1 1SDAR1 SOR 48V AC/DC T7-T7M-X1 1SDAR1 SOR 60V AC/DC T7-T7M-X1 1SDAR1 SOR V AC/DC T7-T7M-X1 1SDAR1 SOR V AC/DC T7-T7M-X1 1SDAR1 SOR V AC/DC T7-T7M-X1 1SDAR1  SOR V AC/DC T7-T7M-X1 1SDAR1 SOR V AC T7-T7M-X1 1SDAR1 SOR V AC T7-T7M-X1 1SDAR1 Note (1): Cannot be used with T2 MCCB fitted with PRDS trip unit Note: For T7 TM in Withdrable Version Sliding Contact Blocks for Fixed and Moving Part are Necessary  Stock items 1 28 Tmax accessories

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